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Restrictions on financial markets vary greatly betweencountries. Many of them, such as explicit or im-
plicit taxes on financial services, have an impact on the net margin of financial intermediation, this be-
ing a way to measure the difference between rates of interest on deposits and on lending.
Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2004) showthat the level of financial repression is very high in countries such as
Belarus, Burundi and Ghana, but very low in Switzerland or the Netherlands.
There is another kind of constraint on the credit markets, and this has to do with the quality of the legal
system. The World Bank (2005) has documented very large differences betweencountries in terms of
collateralrequirementsonloansandbankruptcylaws.LaPortaetal.(1998)showthatthequalityofthe
institutions that enforce these laws is positively correlated with the level of economic development.
It would therefore be interesting to see to what extent these differences in financial frictions between
countries explain the differences in economic development, measured by GDP per capita or the ratio
of total credit to GDP.
This articlestudiesthe effect of these twotypesof credit market frictions on countries’economicdevel-
opment.
1 The two types of friction are the costs of financial intermediation and the capacity to enforce
credit contracts. A general equilibrium model is used, with heterogeneous agents in terms of initial
wealth and entrepreneurial talent, along with independent estimates for the two types of financial fric-
tions. This provides us with a partial explanation of the differences observed between the American
economy and other economies in different stages of development (advanced and developing in
Europe; Latin-American; Asian).
An initial conclusion is that the real capacity to enforce credit contracts can explain to a considerable
degreethe differencesobservedbetweenadvancedEuropeaneconomiesandthe U.S. in a numberof
spheres (GDP per capita, ratio of total credit to GDP and so on). The differences can be explained in
the most part by the varying capacity to enforce credit contracts. In the model, this corresponds to the
fraction of credit that financial intermediaries seize if the debtor defaults. This financial friction also ex-
plainsa significantpart of the differences,interms of GDPpercapita, betweenLatin-Americanandde-
veloping European economies, on the one hand, and the U.S., on the other.
Asecondconclusionisthatthequantitativeimplicationsofthemodeldependcriticallyontheexistence
of a generalequilibriumeffect inwagesandintherateof returnoncapital. This effect variesdepending
on whether the return on capital is determined exogenously(i.e. it is given by international market val-
ues) or endogenously(i.e. it is determined as if the economy was completely closed). The effects of fi-
nancialfrictionsonpercapitaGDPintheeconomyaretypicallymorepronouncedinthefirst thaninthe
second case. This implies that changes in policy affecting the two forms of frictions - and above all the
capacity to enforce credit contracts - will have effects that are especially relevant in the case of small
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(1) For a more detailed analysis of this topic, see Antunes et al. (2008).open economies like the Portuguese. Numerical simulations suggest that a significant part of the dif-
ference between per capita income in Portugal and the United States can be explained by differences
in financial frictions, especially the level of creditor protection.
This article is structured in the followingway:in the next section weoutline the model used and make a
short summary of the literature on the topic; Section 3 details various quantitative exercises; Section 4
concludes.
2. CREDIT MARKET FRICTIONS WITH HETEROGENEOUS AGENTS
We start by giving a qualitative description of the model used in the article. The interested reader will
find a short review of the economic texts available on the topic in Section 2.2 and a more detailed de-
scription of the model in Section 2.3.
2.1. The Model: qualitative description
Let us postulate an economy where the agents reap benefits from consumption and from the re-
sources their predecessors have left them. As life begins, each agent is characterized by the amount
bequested (given here as b) and their entrepreneurial talent (x). On the basis of this and looking at
wage (w) and interest (r) rates, the agent decides whether to become a worker or an employer.
If the option is to become worker, a salary will be earned, a fraction of the accumulated wealth will be
consumed(includingthe initialbequestcapitalisedat the rate of r), withthe remainderpassedonto the
next generation.
If the option is to become an employer, a business scheme will be set in motion, relying on a technol-
ogy based on the number of workersand the amount of capital used. But more important than this, the
quantity of goods that entrepreneurs manage to produce from a specific quantity of inputs depends di-
rectly on their entrepreneurial talent. The employer will have a credit market available to finance the
business. The interest rate for employers in this market is r  , where  reflects implicit and explicit
taxes, along with other market frictions.
Each agent decides on whether to b a worker or employer by comparing the two options in terms of
wealth spread across a lifetime.
The financial intermediaries, whom we can call banks, receive funds from all the agents. They pay out
at rate r on deposits and charge r on loans to entrepreneurs. Financial intermediaries, however,
only lend up to a point where the entrepreneurs have an interest in honouring their commitment at the
endofthecontract:thecreditcontractsmustbecompatiblewiththeincentivesoftheborrower.Inorder
to define this amount clearly, there must be some penalty in the case of default by the debtor. Let us
designate as the fraction of the borrower’s gains that the creditor could recoup if default occurs. This
parameter measures the level at which the legal structure of the economy favours borrowing and the
factors involved are the bankruptcy laws and the collateral pledged against credit. This measurement,
focusing on the level of protection afforded to the creditors, is a convenient designation which will be
used in this work.The biggerthe valueof the biggerthe penaltyfor the borrowerwhodefaults and the
greater the amount of credit that a borrower with specific characteristics can obtain from a financial
institution.
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demand for labour. Demand comes from agents who decide to become workers; supply is the aggre-
gation generated by employers.
As for the interest rate, two situations will be detailed. In the first, the banks are considered as having
access to a market of externalcredit, withoutfrictions, at the exogenousrate r. They can therefore bor-
row enough to cover the demand for funds from entrepreneurs. This situation is that of a small econ-
omy open to capital flows.
In the second situation, the interest rate is determined by the equilibrium between the supply and de-
mand for funds in the credit market. Supply is equal to the aggregate value of bequests at the begin-
ning of the agents’ life; demand comes from the capital which entrepreneurs are planning to invest.
This model is closer to closed economies or to economies where size affects the international credit
markets.
In this type of economy, it is possible to demonstrate that the distribution of wealth left as a bequest is
constant across the generations. The same happens with the price of factors after a period of transi-
tion. It is this “steady state” of the economy that we are going to study.
2.2. Literature
The model described above is related to at least three facets of the economic literature. The first takes
in occupational choices, the dynamics of economic development and inequality, in a tradition dating
back to Lucas (1978) and Banerjee and Newman (1993).
The second group covers the issue of disparities in the average income of various countries, in a tradi-
tion going back to Solow (1957). More recent studies by Prescott (1998) and Hall and Jones (1999)
lookedatthecontributionofcapitalaccumulationandTFPinvariouscountriestoexplainobserveddis-
parities. Other contributions of similar nature have attempted to explain TFP differences through fric-
tion differences in the markets, distortions caused by economic policies or barriers against new
technologies (Parente and Prescott, 1999; Acemoglu and Ventura, 2002).
The third relevant focus is the research on financial market development and economic growth. Some
studies approach this theme from a historical standpoint and look to explain the joint development of
markets and economic progress (Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990; Boyd and Smith, 1998). This arti-
cle fits better in another branch of the literature – studies of the impact of changes in the parameters of
the economy (related with contract policies or others) on the endogenous variables. The work of Cas-
tro et al. (2004), Amaral and Quintin (2007) and Erosa and Hidalgo-Cabrillana (2007), among others,
fits in with this group.
2.3. The model: formalisation
There follows a more detailed description of the type of economy used in this article. Any reader less
interested in the technical aspects of the model can go directly to Section 3.
2.3.1. Agents
Let us suppose that there is a continuum of agents measurable in linear fashion. Each agent, indexed
by  i  01 ; , lives for a fixed period, the same fro everybody, and leaves behind another individual.
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bequests. Each agent gains from consumption and from the bequest left to their successor in line with
the utility function:














1 are respectivelythe amount consumed by agents through their life and the quantity
of goods left as a bequest to the successor. The form of this utility function implies that the agent will
consume fraction  of his wealth at the end of the period and will leave1as a bequest. For the sake
of simplicity, the individual indicator i is hereinafter dropped.
Each agent is given a “entrepreneurial talent” x. This variable is exogenous, independent and distrib-
uted identicallyacross generations, witha cumulative distribution function 	  x defined in the interval
 0;x . We shall standardise x to 1. Each agent’s talent for business is not hereditary, nor can it be
manipulated by the agent.
2.3.2. Production
Production follows a technology of decreasing returns to scale given by:
yx k n 


where  ,  0 and   1 . The good produced can be consumed, used as capital or left as a be-
quest. Capital depreciates totally during the production period.
2.3.3. The credit market
Everyagenthas twooptionsfor investingcapital. The first is to lendrisk-free to financialintermediaries
at rate r. The second is to use their own resources to start a project and then, if necessary, use the
credit market to raise additional capital, on whichr is paid. In this last case, let us assume that the
agents arenotabletocommittopayingoff theloan(capitalplusinterest)atmaturity. Inotherwords,if it
is more advantageousfor agents not to payoff the loanat maturity, in the lightof the penaltyfor default,
they will not do so. The bank, of course, factors this into its calculations and, knowing the profile of the
borrower, it willonlygivea loanupto the pointwherethe agentwillalwayschooseto payoff at maturity.
The calculations underlying this specific amount will be detailed below.
2.3.4. The agents: optimal behaviour
All agents optimise their use of resources with a view to production of the final good. Let us first con-
sider the problem of a businessman with entrepreneurial talent x for a fixed amount of capital k and
given wage level w:
	 
 kxw x k n w n
n
,; m a x 

This function gives us production net of wages, with the associated labour supply function 	 nkxw ,; .
This is the part which can be seized by the authorities in the case of default, since the capital depreci-
ates totally during the production period.
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cial institutions. The optimization problem for an entrepreneur with talent x and bequest b is:
	  	  	 	 Vbxw a lxw ra r l
al
,; m a x ,;
,





	  	   al x w r l    ,; 1
ab  .
The objective function is easy to understand. The first term represents output net of wages. The sec-
ond term is the opportunitycost of capital financed by the entrepreneur. The third term is repayment of
the loan, and includes principal, interest and the costs of intermediation.
The first constraintensuresthattheloaniscompatiblewiththeincentivesofthebankandtheentrepre-
neur. The amount whichthe creditor manages to seize on default, 	  al x w  ,; , is equal to or higher
than the amount to be repaid by the debtor,	 1 rl  . This constraint ensures that the entrepreneur
prefers to pay the loan rather than default. The amount that the entrepreneur manages to retain if de-
fault occurs,	  	 	 11    al x w r a ,; , should not be more than what they get if the loan is paid
off, 	  	  	  al x w r a r l      ,; 1 1 . This restriction is clearly equivalent to the first. The parame-
ter will therefore have a major influence on the maximum figure of the loans in question.
The second constraint means that the level of self-finance is determined by the agent’s bequest.
There is an investment function 	 kbxw r ,;, associated with this problem. It gives us the scale of in-
vestment for each entrepreneur, given type and prices.
2.3.5. The choice of occupation and consumption
Given their types,	 bx , , and prices,	 wr , , agents will choose the occupation that affords them most
revenue: they will choose to be entrepreneurs if 	 Vbxwr w ,;,  ; they will choose paid employment if
	 Vbxwr w ,;,  ; they will have no specific feelings either way if 	 Vbxwr w ,;, 
 . To simplify, let us
suppose that in the third case above, they all decide to be entrepreneurs. Such a hypothesis is
completely innocuous.
The agent’s total income through life is given by:
	  	 YV b x w r wr b 
  max , ; , , . 1
This amount will be spread between consumption and a bequest for the agent’s successor, in accor-
dance with the utility function detailed earlier.
2.3.6. Market equilibrium
If 	  b is defined as the measure (or if preferred, as the cumulative distribution function) of all be-
quests at the start of the period, there will be equilibrium in the labour market if:
 	 	 	 	 	 n x w r db dx db dx ;, .  
entrepreneurs workers   
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prefer to be entrepreneurs. This corresponds to the demand for labour, and the integral on the right
correspondstothelaboursupply.Theequilibriumwagerateistheonethatmakestheintegralsequal.
As for the interestrate – in the caseit is exogenous– the labourmarket equationdetermineseconomic
equilibrium. If the interest rate is endogenous, we need an additional equation to characterize the
credit market:
 	 	 	 	 	 k b x w rd bd x d bd x ,;, .  
entrepreneurs all agents   

The left side of this equation is the demand for capital from entrepreneurs for investment. The right
side translates the amount of resources existing at the start of the period, which will then be used in
production. This is therefore the supply of capital. Antunes et al. (2007) show that this economy’s
steady state is characterised by a unique endogenous distribution of bequests 	  b and a pair of
prices	 wr , . The size clearly depends on the model’s parameters, particularly those of most interest
in this article,  and .
3. QUANTITATIVE EXERCISES
Foraquantitativeanalysisofthefrictionsinthecreditmarketthatinterestus,wemustfirst calibratethe
model for a real economy. This willbe our baseline. We then use independent estimates of the param-
eters of interest in our problemand compare the results withthe baseline.In this way, wewillbe able to
assess changesin the economicpoliciesthat affect the parametersin terms of their impact on different
measures of economic performance such as per capita GDP or the total credit granted as a
percentage of GDP.
3.1. Calibration
The calibration process consists in selecting specific measurements of the real economy that we con-
sider important for this analysis, and then choose parameters in such a way that the measurements
obtained in the model are “similar” to the real ones.
The American economy in a steady state was used as the baseline. This was taken as a long-term
equilibrium where economic variables grow at a constant rate. The reasons for this choice are based
on the availability of data, the relevance of this economy and above all that it is considered to be close
to a steady state. If, for instance, we look at a graph of real GDP per capita for the United States over
time in log terms, we can see (taking out the economic cycle component) something very similar
straight line (with slope equal to the average American’s income real rate of growth). In addition, the
quotient between capital and output or between salaries and output, shows a clear stability over time,
suggesting that the economy is indeed near a steady state.
Table 1 shows the value given to each parameter in the model by our calibration and the measure-
ments in the real economy that we try to reproduce in our model. The duration of each period in this
economy is 35 years. In terms of the parameters for the production function, we have used values that
ensure that the fraction of salaries and remuneration of capital in GDP are equal to the amounts in fact
observed. The fraction of income left as a bequest was chosen in such a way as to make the model’s
equilibrium interest rate r equal to the real rate of return on post-war U.S. T-bills, 2% according to the
International Financial Statistics of the IMF.
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 xx 

1
 . The parameter  was calibrated in such a way that the Gini index of entrepreneurial in-
come was 45%, a figure reported by Quadrini (1999).
Intermediation costs were based on Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) and correspond to implicit or
explicit taxes paid as a percentage of banks’ assets.
2
Finally, parameteris calibratedinsuchawaythat thepercentageof entrepreneursinthetotalpopula-
tion is around 9 percent, a figure reported by Quadrini (1999).
Table 2 compares some of the measurements obtained from the model using this calibration with their
real counterparts. The aims of the calibration are achieved in a sufficiently accurate way(annual inter-
est rate, proportion of entrepreneurs, Gini index of entrepreneurs’ income). Besides this, the capi-
tal-output ratio and the quotient betweenprivate credit and the product (variables not used to calibrate
the model) are clearly near the figures for the U.S. economy. This gives us a certain comfort when
comparing different economies in terms of these two entities.
3.2. Impact of the parameters
There are changes in some of the endogenous variables of the model stemming from variations in the
parameter of financial intermediation, , and creditor protection, . These variations are calculated by
taking into account the exogenous or endogenous rate of interest.
3.2.1. Financial intermediation
Table 3 showsthe variation in some of the endogenous entities in the model whenwe multiply by 4 the
cost of financial intermediation relative to the baseline case. Let us look first at the case wherethe rate
of interest is exogenous. Product per capita falls to 85.2 per cent of the baseline case and the equilib-
rium wagerate to 85.9 of the initial level. The percentage of entrepreneurs rises, whilethe quotient be-
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Table 1
MODEL PARAMETERS – CALIBRATION FOR THE AMERICAN ECONOMY
 0.55 Fraction of wages in output
 0.35 Fraction of capital returns in output
 0.94 Fraction of income consumed
 4.422 Distribution of entrepreneurial ability
 0.005 Intermediation cost
 0.26 Creditor protection
Table 2
BASIC STATISTICS FOR THE AMERICAN ECONOMY AND THE MODEL ECONOMY
American economy Model economy
Yearly real interest rate (%) 2 2
Taxes as a percentage of bank assets 0.5 0.5
Percentage of entrepreneurs 9 8.8
Gini index for entrepreneurs (%) 45 45.35
Capital to output ratio 2.5 2.24
Credit to output ratio 1.98 2.02
(2) The use of measurements such as the net margin of financial intermediation has some drawbacks (see Antuneset al., 2008, for more details).tween credit granted and product per capita falls from 2.02 to 1.46. The inequality among entrepre-
neurs, measured by the Gini index, falls from 45.35 to 44.83 per cent. How can these changes be ex-
plained when moves from 0.5 per cent to 2 per cent? This increase in the costs of intermediation has
the effect of reducing the demand for loans from entrepreneurs for a specific rate of interest. This is a
demand effect. The reduction in the amount of loans means that the investment in capital falls and this
cuts the demand for labour. For there to be equilibrium in the labour market, there will have to be a
combination of lower salaries and a larger number of small enterprises, offsetting the fall in demand.
This means that there will be additional agents choosing to be entrepreneurs and self-financing their
operations; at the margin, these agents are also less productive and willhave smaller bequests. In this
way there will be more entrepreneurs but with less productive projects and smaller enterprises. There
is a tendency for entrepreneurs’ incomes to be standardised.
When the rate of interest is endogenous, the effects of changes in  in the endogenous variables that
we have seen are much lower. Product per capita falls to 93.7 per cent of the baseline level. The wage
rate becomes 96.7 of the initial level. The percentage of entrepreneurs goes up (although less than
previously) while the quotient between total credit and the product remains virtually unchanged. The
inequalityin distribution of income among entrepreneurs nowrises to 46.1 per cent and the real rate of
interest falls to 0.82 per cent. How can these results be rationalised? The demand effect described
earlier has now an added general equilibrium effect. As the rate of interest is endogenous, the fall in
demand for funds, stemming from the rise in the costs of intermediation, causes the rate of interest to
fall. A lower rate of interest implies a bigger level of capital, more productivity and bigger companies.
The riseininequalityindistributionamongentrepreneurssuggests that thefallinincomealreadyexist-
ing (whichwouldreduce inequality)is more than offset by the lowerproductivityof the additionalentre-
preneurs. The general equilibrium effect is partial compensation for the demand effect in a variety of
ways. The results set out in Table 3 suggest that the general equilibrium effect is quantitatively
important.
3.2.2. Creditor protection
If the figure for creditor protection is reduced to a quarter of the baseline(Table 4), there are major ef-
fects whenthe rate of interest is exogenous. Product per capita falls to 57.6 per cent of the initial level,
whilesalariesfall to 55.3per cent of the baselinefigure.The percentageof entrepreneursrises consid-
erably to 12.9 per cent of the active population, while the ratio of credit granted to product per capita
falls from 2.02 to 0.46. The inequality of income among entrepreneurs narrows, although the average
income is substantially lower. Again there are more entrepreneurs in the economy but they are less
productive. The lower level of creditor protection reduces the incentive for credit contracts, and this
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Table 3






Output (base = 100) 100.0 85.2 93.7
Wage rate (base = 100) 100.0 85.9 96.7
% of entrepreneurs 8.8 9.3 9.1
Credit to output ratio 2.0 1.5 2.0
Gini index for entrepreneurs (%) 45.4 44.8 46.1
Yearly real interest rate (%) 2.0 2.0 0.8means a lower maximum amount available for each entrepreneur. The demand for funds for invest-
ment falls. The effects of this fall are similar to the demand effect described earlier.
When the rate of interest is endogenous, the effects are quantitatively identical to the previous case
and again we see the importance of the general equilibrium effect. The real rate of interest falls to a
negative figure (-2.6 per cent per year). This result is consistent with the observation of Calomiris and
Beim (2000) that some financially repressed economies (closed economies with low levels of creditor




Having identified the main effects caused by variations in the parameters  and , let us see how the
model can be used to compare different economies. The exercise consists in collecting independent
estimatesof andfor a numberof countriesandresolvethe modelusingthesefigures,leavingallthe
other parameters equal to those in Table 1. The purpose of this exercise is to check what wouldbe the
product per capita in the U.S. if the costs of financial intermediation and the level of creditor protection
werethe same, for example,as Russia. In this way, an attempt is made to isolate the effects due solely
tothesetwofactors.Thesimulationswillbemadeforbothexogenousandendogenousinterestrates.
The results for representative economies will be given – Brazil for Latin America, France and Portugal
for Europe, Russia for transition economies and Singapore for high-growthAsian countries. The costs
of intermediationare measured byexplicitor implicit taxes on intermediationas a percentage of the to-
tal assets paid by banks (see Table 5). The level of creditor protection is based on the World Bank
(2005) and Djankov et al. (2005). This consists of a scale of 1 to 10 measuring the extent to which ac-
cess to credit is conditioned by bankruptcy laws and the laws applicable to the use of collateral. This
amounts to a de juris measurement of . In order to construct a de facto measurement of , the previ-
ous figure is multiplied by a measure of the extent to which entrepreneurs consider that the laws are
applied (Kaufmann et al., 2003). This figure is then standardised using the level for the U.S. as the
baseline (
02 6 . ; see Table 5).
3
When the rate of interest is exogenous, these two factors explain more than half of the differences in
terms of productpercapita betweenBrazilandtheU.S. andthewholedifferenceinterms of theratioof
credit to product. Looking at the impact of each parameter separately, it is clear that the costs of finan-
cialintermediationarenotasimportantascreditorprotection.Whentherateofinterestisendogenous,
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Table 4





Output (base = 100) 100.0 57.6 96.9
Wage rate (base = 100) 100.0 55.3 98.7
% of entrepreneurs 8.8 12.9 10.2
Credit to output ratio 2.0 0.5 1.9
Gini index for entrepreneurs (%) 45.4 43.3 49.7
Yearly real interest rate (%) 2.0 2.0 -2.7
(3) The results obtained using the de juris figure for  mentioned earlier do not change the conclusions obtained for a wider range of countries de facto. See
Antunes et al. (2008). 333 3these financial frictions only explain a small part of the difference in product per capita and the ratio of
credit to product. The simulations for Russia give similar results, though the costs of intermediation
would seem to have greater effects than for Brazil.
The case of Singapore is interesting because the parameter for creditor protection is larger than in the
U.S. and the costs of intermediationare the same. The model anticipates a product per capita 14.7 per
cent higher than the U.S., but the data actually point to a product per capita 32 per cent lower. In the
context of the model, this discrepancy can be explained by two kinds of factor:
I. Parameters such as those that govern the distributionof entrepreneurialtalent (and x) or the
fraction left as bequest (1). For example, if U.S. entrepreneurs wereto have average quali-
fications different from Singapore, or if the institutional infrastructure which American entre-
preneurs use (excluding whatever is related to credit markets, which are explicitly modelled)
were to be different from Singapore, then parameters  and x could be different in the two
economies, contrary to what has been assumed here.
II. Creditor protection and access to credit may not have a monotone relationship, as assumed
in this model. Dubey et al. (2005) show that when some agents default in equilibrium there
may be an optimum creditor protection level.
When the interest rate is exogenous, the differences in financial frictions between Portugal and the
U.S. explain around half the difference in terms of product per capita. This suggests that, as with Sin-
gapore, other factors (namely entrepreneurial talent) may explain part of the remaining difference. In
the ratio of credit to product, the model undervalues the figure shown in the data: 1.03 against 1.27. In
the context of the model, the Portuguese financial sector appears, however, to be more efficient than
the creditor protection parameter would seem to show. Lower creditor protection may be partially off-
set, for example, through closer follow-upof those projects that are financed. When the rate of interest
is endogenous, the results are in essence the same as for the baseline case.
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Exogenous interest rate Endogenous interest rate




United States (base) 0.260 0.5 100.0 2.0 100.0 2.0
Brazil (data) 0.039 1.1 22.0 0.4 22.0 0.4
Intermediation cost 0.260 1.1 94.2 1.8 97.8 2.0
Creditor protection 0.039 0.5 49.2 0.3 93.8 1.9
Both 0.039 1.1 47.6 0.3 93.5 1.9
France (data) 0.100 0.2 77.0 0.9 77.0 0.9
Intermediation cost 0.260 0.2 103.1 2.1 97.8 2.0
Creditor protection 0.100 0.5 68.4 0.7 97.7 1.9
Both 0.100 0.2 70.1 0.8 98.7 2.0
Portugal (data) 0.136 0.3 53.0 1.3 53.0 1.3
Intermediation cost 0.260 0.3 101.1 2.1 100.8 2.0
Creditor protection 0.136 0.5 76.9 1.0 98.4 2.0
Both 0.136 0.3 78.3 1.0 99.0 2.0
Russia (data) 0.045 1.9 23.0 0.2 23.0 0.2
Intermediation cost 0.260 1.9 86.3 1.5 93.9 2.0
Creditor protection 0.045 0.5 51.2 0.3 96.5 1.9
Both 0.045 1.9 46.9 0.2 87.7 1.9
Singapore (data) 0.380 0.5 68.0 1.2 68.0 1.2
Intermediation cost 0.260 0.5 100.0 2.0 100.0 2.0
Creditor protection 0.370 0.5 114.3 3.1 101.1 2.1
Both 0.370 0.5 114.3 3.1 101.1 2.1France is similar to Portugal, except that the real data show greater similarity with the American econ-
omy than the model. The remarks made on Singapore are also applicable here.
In Antunes et al. (2008), it is demonstrated that the results above are valid for a wide range of coun-
tries: when the rate of interest is exogenous, variations in the two parameters explain a large propor-
tion of the differences between countries in terms of product per capita and the ratio of credit to
product. If the rate of interest is endogenous, these results are substantially lower through the general
equilibrium effect. The results are also valid when there is a sector of large enterprises with no credit
constraints.
The two paradigms analysed (exogenous and endogenous rates of interest) can be seen as two ex-
tremes in terms of the capacityof financialinstitutionsto obtain outside resourcesat market rates of in-
terest. This suggests that in a small open economy, the rate of interest is likely to be exogenous, while
in a closed or large economy, the rates of interest are likely to be influenced by the economy’s own pa-
rameters. The corollary of this is that reforms leading to cuts in the costs of intermediation or to in-
creases in effective creditor protection will have a bigger impact in small countries with financial
markets open to the outside world. These reforms may not be effective in closed economies (as hap-
pened in Latin America, the Middle East and North Africa before financial liberalisation in the 90s),
since the general equilibrium effect tends to cancel out the looked-for demand effect.
It isworthnotingthatinsmallopeneconomies,theforeigninterestrateinfactpaidbyfinancialinterme-
diaries may be affected by the state of these economies and is not therefore totally exogenous. There
may exist, for example, a market, liquidityor operational risk premium or indeed other factors. This im-
plies that the figures obtained for the exogenous rate of interest will be the upper limit of the effects of
variations in the parameters which we have looked at. In a small open economy like Portugal’s, where
other frictions and uncertainty exist, the effects are likely to be found somewhere between the two
cases analysed (exogenous and endogenous rates of interest).
4. CONCLUSION
In this article, a modelhas beenstructured for a qualitative anda quantitative studyof the effects stem-
ming from twofinancialfrictions – costs of intermediationand creditor protection– on variablesused to
gaugeeconomicdevelopment:productpercapita, theratioof creditto product,theproportionof entre-
preneurs in the economy, and inequality in distribution of income.
With independentmeasurements used for the twofrictions, it is possibleto see that the modelexplains
part of the differences observed betweencountries in terms of product per capita and the ratio of credit
to product. The quantitative implications of the market depend critically on whether the rate of interest
is exogenous or endogenous, with the effects on product per capita typically more pronounced when
the rate of interest is exogenous.
The implicationsfor economicpolicyare clear: whenit is reasonableto assume that the rate of interest
isexogenous,ashappensifbankshaveaccesstofinanceabroadatmarketrates,thereisabigimpact
on the improvements to the technologies of creditor protection and financial intermediation. If the rate
of interest is endogenous, as when the banks cannot draw on finance from abroad at market rates,
there is a big price effect on the factors that tend to hamper the impact of reforms.
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